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Abstract
Retailers often stock items that are only slightly di¤erentiated from othersdi¤er-
ent sizes of a popular brand, or di¤erent avors in a common product line for instance.
We argue that this practice is a form of strategic obfuscation, intended to raise con-
sumer search costs, and margins on non-comparable products. We test our hypothesis
using examples from several product categories in German and French retail scanner
data. We nd that, after controlling for other explanations for how margins can vary
with package size, we cannot rule out strategic obfuscation as a feature of our retail
sales data.
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1 Introduction
Consumer product manufacturers tend to o¤er retailer-specic variants of common brands.
While they may be targeting di¤erent segments of the market by doing so, it also e¤ectively
prevents direct price-comparison (Wilson-Jeanselme and Reynolds 2005). For example, Gen-
eral Mills Honey Nut Cheerios are o¤ered online through one major US retailer in 12.25 oz,
17.0 oz, and 21.6 oz packages, while the same product is o¤ered online through a di¤erent
retailer in 12.25 oz, 21.6 oz, and 26.6 oz sizes. Whether such di¤erentiation amounts to
strategic obfuscation in the sense of Ellison and Ellison (2005, 2009), however, is largely an
empirical question.
Strategic obfuscation describes decisions made by suppliers that are designed to prevent
comparison among vendors, or by service providers to prevent comparing their products rel-
ative to others. For example, insurance providers tend to provide subtly di¤erent contract
terms in order to prevent consumers from comparing the true coverage per dollar of premium
among rms. Strategic obfuscation is more than simple di¤erentiation. Product di¤eren-
tiation is intended to create products that appeal to heterogeneous preferences, but many
product attributes provided by sellers cannot be justied on the basis of either vertical or
horizontal di¤erentiation, because they appeal to di¤erences that would be trivial from the
perspective of preferences, and are more reasonably due only to the prevention of direct com-
parisons. By o¤ering di¤erent package sizes, suppliers retailers and manufacturers both 
raise the cost of comparing prices among similar products. If search costs are higher, search
intensity will fall, and equilibrium prices, and margins, will rise (Ellison and Wolitzky 2012).
In this paper, we examine whether there is evidence that consumer-product suppliers o¤er
slightly di¤erentiated items relative to their competitors as a means of strategic obfuscation,
and margin enhancement.
Retailers may o¤er di¤erent package sizes for reasons other than strategic obfuscation.
Because retailers are likely to target di¤erent market segments, and consumers have hetero-
geneneous preferences for package sizes (Subramanian and Gal-Or 2009), package sizes may
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di¤er simply due to horizontal di¤erentiation. Second, retailers and manufacturers both tend
to practice second-degree price discrimination by o¤ering larger packages at lower unit prices
(Cohen 2008). Third, individual items may come in di¤erent aggregations six-packs versus
twelve-packs of soda, for example due to variations in block-pricing strategies among retail-
ers. Cakir and Balagtas (2012) argue that package downsizing is used as a means of passing
along input price increases without losing market share, while Yonezawa and Richards (2016)
show that this argument is incomplete as it does not allow for strategic behavior among re-
tailers and manufacturers. Because there are many reasons for o¤ering di¤erent packages,
identifying strategic obfuscation in consumer packaged goods requires that other motivations
for package variation must be adequately controlled in the empirical model.
We assume the goal of any attempt at strategic obfuscation is to raise equilibrium prices,
and margins. Estimating margins, in turn, requires a structural model of demand that
accounts for variation in package size among brands, and equilibrium price responses among
competing retailers. In this study, we estimate the demand for a closely-related set of items
using a random-coe¢ cient logit (RCL) model, and then derive retailers optimal pricing
decisions, allowing for deviations from pure Bertrand-Nash competition. Conditional on
other possible explanations for how package-variation can inuence demand, we then estimate
the e¤ect of "product uniqueness" on equilibrium retail margins. While retailers o¤er many
items that are by denition unique store-brands we focus on subtle variants of a well-
known national brand in order to isolate the e¤ect of uniqueness on equilibrium margins.
Our data experiment exploits observed variation in package sizes, and package forms, for
the same brands across a sample of retailers. Namely, we compare variants of the same brands
in the soft-drink category o¤ered by 5 retailers in France that are sold in various package sizes
or forms. Within these brands, we choose a sample of 18 variants o¤ered among the retailers,
7 of which are o¤ered in common, or by all 5 retailers, and 11 that are o¤ered by only 1
of the 5.1 We evaluate the robustness of our ndings using a similar sampling procedure
1We dene a unique o¤ering as one in which a particular retailer is the dominant supplier. We provide
more details on our experimental design below.
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applied to di¤erent packages of ground co¤ee across retailers in Germany. Because some of
the variation in package o¤erings may be due to either heterogeneity in package-preference
or retailersuse of second-degree price discrimination, we control for variation in consumer
demand and retailer strategy through a structural econometric model of demand and retailer
pricing. We interpret the remaining variation in package size as retailersattempt to raise
consumerscosts of searching otherwise identical products across retailers, and estimate the
e¤ect of this lack of comparability on retail margins.
We nd that consumers in our French data do indeed have heterogeneous package-size
(and form) preferences, and that retailers vary in their tendencies to use package size strate-
gically. We nd that o¤ering a package-variant that is unique to a particular retailer is
associated with a higher willingness-to-pay among consumers, and equilibrium margins that
are nearly 10% greater than those that are o¤ered by all retailers. Our ndings, however,
may be specic to the food retailing industry in France, so we examine the data from a
similar sampling strategy in German co¤ee sales.2 Our results are largely conrmed in the
German case, and are remarkably similar quantitatively. After controlling for other plausible
reasons for why prices may di¤er across pack size, we interpret our ndings as evidence of
strategic obfuscation in consumer packaged goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we provide
some background on what is known about strategic obfuscation, in terms of both theoretical
expectations, and empirical evidence. In section 3, we describe our data, how we designed
our data experiment, and provide some summary evidence of price di¤erentials between
items o¤ered across retailers, and those o¤ered by a single retailer. In the fourth section
we present a formal econometric test of strategic obfuscation, and explain our identication
strategy. Our estimation results and discussion are given in the fth section, while the sixth
o¤ers some more general conclusions, and implications for retailing in general.
2German retailing di¤ers from that found in France mainly in the more substantial presence of hard
discounters, such as Aldi, that may inuence the ability to strategically obfuscate.
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2 Conceptual Background
Ignorance as a source of market power has been well understood since Scitovsky (1950).
Indeed, Diamond (1971) shows that if search costs rise even a small amount above zero, a
competitive equilibrium can devolve into a monopolistic one, with the attendant reduction
in e¢ ciency. If rms are able to make comparisons of their price with rivalsdi¢ cult or
costly, then they will be more likely to sell to consumers unwilling to search for the true
price. However, our notion of strategic obfuscation is di¤erent. In the extant literature,
there are two types of obfuscation: (1) adding attributes to obscure the true nature of the
product (Ellison 2005; Gabaix and Laibson 2006; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Kalayci and
Potters 2011; Persson 2016), or (2) making the pricing structure itself su¢ ciently complex
that consumers have di¢ culty determining the true price (Carlin 2009; Wilson 2010; Wilson
and Waddams-Price 2010; Chioveanu and Zhou 2013; Muir, Seim, and Vitorino 2013).3 Our
concept is a combination of the two in that package types are inherent attributes of the
item being purchased, and the pricing structure is typically by the package, not by the
unit-of-measure. While our concept of obfuscation is clearly related to the others, there are
important di¤erences.
Much of what we know about strategic obfuscation is based on settings in which rms are
able to vary the attributes of their product such that direct price comparisons are di¢ cult,
or at least more costly (Ellison 2005; Gabaix and Laibson 2006).4 If rms have the ability to
"add-on" features that raise the nal price, but are not necessarily advertised, they can use
these features to price discriminate in a competitive environment (Ellison 2005). Add-ons
give rise to an adverse selection e¤ect: The additional prots due to add-ons are not bid
away because prices are pushed su¢ ciently far apart that the rm attracts a large number
3Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) describe a more general form of obfuscation that can include both attribute
and pricing obfuscation as special cases. They show that it is individually-rational for rms to obfuscate in
a competitive model of costly search and oligopolistic rivalry.
4"Versioning" is a type of obfuscation through attribute variation in which the intent is to induce con-
sumers to self-select into higher or lower-priced variants where the di¤erence is unrelated to cost (Varian
1997).
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of "cheapskates" to the base product, and su¢ cient others willing to buy the add-on so that
prots are sustainable in a competitive equilibrium. However, competitors should still be
able to reveal the nature of these add-ons and remove any prot opportunities. Nonetheless,
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that when the market consists of a substantial number
of naive consumers who are unaware of the add-on premium, add-ons can proliferate in
equilibrium. Essentially, add-ons are a form of strategic obfuscation as they are intended
to raise the e¤ective price of an item without a¤ecting the "shelf price" or the price that
consumers initially see when searching for the product. Because adding features to mass-
produced consumer products is often not possible, these models describe a special case that
is not typical of most retail markets. Moreover, empirically, strategic obfuscation through
attribute complexity is di¢ cult to identify independent from mere di¤erentiation (Kalayci
and Potters 2011). Therefore, we focus on obfuscation through costly search for prices.
Prices are not transparent in many, important markets. For example, Carlin (2009)
studies price dispersion in nancial markets. Using an oligopoly search model, he shows that
prices rise in the complexity of the price structure, and interprets complexity as strategic
obfuscation. Somewhat counter-intuitively, he shows that as the number of rms grows, then
market does not necessarily become more competitive as the degree of complexity, and hence
obfuscation, rises accordingly. The reason is straightforward: As more rms enter, each rm
receives a smaller share of expert buyers. Therefore, their best response is to increase the
level of complexity in order to increase rents from uninformed consumers when they do not
"win" the expert consumers. As each rm has an incentive to do the same, the fraction
of informed consumers falls as rms enter complexity tends to reduce competition more
generally. Firms actively manage the level of obfuscation as the proportion of uninformed
consumers is endogenously determined by the complexity choices made by the rms.
Further emphasizing the strategic nature of obfuscation, Wilson (2010) describes a the-
oretical model in which rms are asymmetric, and use obfuscation in order to separate
themselves from other rms, which he terms "prominent" rms, that choose to remain easily
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searchable and transparent. Agents with positive time costs rst search the rival (prominent
rm), which raises its price, and softens competition for the customers that choose to search
beyond the most immediately transparent rm. The prominent rm has no incentive to ob-
fuscate because doing so reduces prots to both rms, so the prots due to obfuscation are
not bid away in a Nash equilibrium. However, equilibrium prices are lower with obfuscation
in his model, so he describes a di¤erent outcome than we have in mind here.
Others predict that complex pricing structures can lead to higher equilibrium prices. In
fact, how prices are framed can a¤ect complexity (Spiegler 2006; Piccione and Spiegler 2012;
Chioveanu and Zhou 2013), where price framing refers to how prices are presented to the
consumer  in retail gasoline, prices are dened on a per-gallon basis, but are o¤ered per
box, or per unit, in the retail consumer packaged good industry. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)
nd that, in equilibrium, rms randomize their choice of price frame in order to reduce the
elasticity of demand, and sustain positive prots. Firms choose both frame di¤erentiation,
and frame complexity, so there is 2 separate dimensions as to how obfuscation enters the
model. Similarly, using the bounded-rationality assumption of Spiegler (2006), Piccione and
Spiegler (2012) argue that when rms compete in prices and complexity, prices will not fall
to the competitive level, even when the products are homogenous. The same holds true
in a service conext as Muir, Seim, and Vitorino (2013) nd empirical evidence that more
complex pricing structures are responsible for higher search costs, greater price di¤erences
among suppliers, and higher markups. Obfuscation in services such as this is common, but
it is di¢ cult to disentangle what is horizontal di¤erentiation from complexity in pricing
schedules.5
Clear separation between complexity and di¤erentiation is perhaps best achieved in the
lab. For example, Kalayci and Potters (2011) induce subjectspreferences for an hypothetical
consumer good, so are able to hold willingness-to-pay constant while varying the complexity
of the pricing terms. Complexity is still described in terms of the number of attributes
5Piccione and Spiegler (2012) argue that their approach provides a new interpretation of di¤erentiation
that admits perceptual di¤erentiation through framing complexity.
6
their subjects must consider in comparing products, but attributes do not a¤ect utility.
Allowing complexity to vary randomly over a series of product choices is another alternative
(Sitzia and Zizzo 2009). Using this approach, Sitzia and Zizzo (2009) attempt to disentangle
subjectsaversion to complexity from their sense of being exploited, and nd no evidence of
complexity aversion, and only weak evidence in support of their exploitation hypothesis.
Experiments do contribute to a growing body of literature that examines whether there
is empirical support for strategic obfuscation a literature that also includes investigation
using secondary data (Ellison and Ellison 2009; Wilson and Waddams-Price 2010). Other
than Sitzia and Zizzo (2009), the evidence shows that strategic obfuscation is an empirical
regularity in many real-world markets, whether online or o­ ine. However, there is no em-
pirical research that considers the role that simple variation in packaging plays in obscuring
comparisons between otherwise identical products. While we do not model obfuscation in
a lab environment, our data experiment achieves sharp identication of the e¤ect of obfus-
cation by comparing equilibrium pricing strategies between items o¤ered in common, and
those o¤ered by a single retailer.
3 Data and Identication Strategy
Our primary demand data are drawn from two sources. The rst consists of a large-scale,
household-panel data set of soft-drink purchases by consumers in France (Kantar TNSWorld-
panel). The second is from a similar household-panel data set, the Consumer Panel by GfK
Panel Services, which describes co¤ee purchases in Germany. The French data includes
purchases made by panelists during 2013, while the German data includes purchases made
during 2009 and 2010.6 Both data sets are collected by panelists on a purchase-occasion
basis, and include the full complement of purchase records (brand, item, price, quantity,
purchase attributes), household demographics (age, income, education, household size, and
place of residence), and a small set of store attributes (store size, and parent company).
6GfK Panel Services data are not available beyond the 2010 calendar year.
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Although both data sets include purchases from a large number of categories and retailers,
we draw data to dene very specic choice environments in which strategic obfuscation is
likely to be identied, if it indeed exists. In the analysis to follow, we present summary data
and detailed results from the French case, and then corroborating evidence from the German
sample.
In the case of France, we choose a set of variants o¤ered by a single carbonated soft-
drink manufacturer, across three di¤erent brands, sold through ve di¤erent retailers.7 We
chose these brands because of their wide distribution across nearly all retailers, the num-
ber of variants o¤ered within each, and the large number of purchase-transactions in our
household-panel data. While the brands are widely distributed throughout the country, the
manufacturer o¤ers a range of variants, di¤erentiated by the type of container (bottle or
can), the size of the container, and the size of the multi-pack "brick," if not purchased as a
single item. From these 3 brands, we selected several that were o¤ered in common across
all ve retailers, and another sub-set that were o¤ered in only one of the retailers over the
sample period. In this way, our data forms a natural experiment, with the items o¤ered in
common serving as control, and those unique to individual retailers as the treatment items.
Control items were chosen as they were the best-selling variants, while the treatment items
were chosen according to the protocol described below. Our nal sample, therefore, consists
of 18 di¤erent items, sometimes di¤ering only in container form, container size, or pack size,
and sometimes not di¤ering at all. Of the 18 items, 11 are unique to one retailer, while 7
are o¤ered in various combinations across either all or subsets of the other retailers. In total
across the 5 retailers, there are 69 retailer / item combinations.
For the German co¤ee data, a similar approach was taken in isolating unique variants of
popular brands. Namely, we chose 2 co¤ee brands, sold through 5 of the largest retailers.
These brands were chosen specically because one brand o¤ered sub-brands that embodied
7The specic identity of the manufacturer, brands, and retailers in our sample are not disclosed for
condentiality reasons. However, the manufacturer is a major multi-national rm with many brands that
are in wide distribution. The retailers are among the top 10 in France.
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attributes unique to one of the sample retailers, while the other one was similar in size,
thereby serving as a control. Because co¤ee is generally o¤ered in only one type of container,
the unique attributes were some combination of package size, and whether the packages were
o¤ered together in a "multi-pack." Because each parent brand has several other sub-brands,
there are 10 variants, leading to 38 retailer / item combinations. Of the 38 retailer / item
combinations 4 are unique variants.
The design of the data experiment is important as truly unique items are purposefully
rare. We selected the items to include in the experiment using the following approach: In the
French data, there were 84 separate items (brands, containers, sizes, and packs) among the
three brands sold at the 5 retailers, so we needed to select down to a tractable experiment
size. From these 84 items, several did not sell frequently over the sample period, so were
eliminated. Among the items that remained, over 76% were sold by at least 2 retailers, and
most items sold at least a few times in each retailer. Therefore, the denition of "unique"
includes items with 80% or greater of their sales volume through only one retailer. This is
reasonable because the data set is a panel over retailers and time, so items that sold only a
few times in a particular retailer were simply out of the market for much of the sample period.
In e¤ect, therefore, the "80%" rule means that an item was truly unique 80% of the time.8
Because this rule limits the number of unique items, in order to maintain representation for
both types of items, unique items were over-selected so that the nal sample consists of 11
unique items and 7 items o¤ered in common. Selecting items in this way means that our
data represents a natural experiment in obfuscation, with 7 control items, and 11 treatment
items. In the German data, this approach generates 8 control items and 2 treatment items.
As a rst step, we calculated the unit prices for each item in order to determine whether
there was any summary evidence of price di¤erences between unique and non-unique, com-
mon, items. The summary data for the French soft-drink case are presented in the upper
part of table 1. For brand 1, the average unit prices for unique items is 1:40 euros / litre,
8We estimated a version of the model using a "70% rule" instead and the results were not qualitatively
di¤erent, although the sample of unique items was larger.
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while the average price for items o¤ered in common is 1:12, or a 25% di¤erence in prices. For
brand 2, the price di¤erence is slightly smaller, with unique items selling for an average of
1:07 euros / litre and common items for 0:99 euros / litre (8:1% di¤erence). For brand 3, the
price di¤erential is 0.15 euros / litre (1:16 versus 1:01), or 14:9% of the selling price. Each
of the price di¤erences is statistically signicant at a 5% level. The same general pattern
can be seen in the German case (lower part of table 1). In the data sample, unique items
sell for more than 1:00 euros / kg more than items sold in common across all retailers (9:49
versus 8:24), or 15:1%. Based on this summary evidence, therefore, items sold at a single
retailer sell for a higher price. Because this di¤erence may be due to simple di¤erentiation, or
perhaps second-degree price discrimination, however, it is necessary to control for variation
in product attributes, and retailer pricing strategies, in order to test more rigorously for the
likelihood that the price di¤erentials are due to strategic obfuscation.
[table 1 here]
Price-premia for unique items may, however, be due to a variety-e¤ect rather than strate-
gic obfuscation. That is, a larger store may simply o¤er unique items merely because it has
more shelf-space, and an ability to sell a range of items that other retailers do not have. To
examine this possibility, we categorized each retailer in the French data as either a "small
store" (< 400 m2), a supermarket (between 400 m2 and 2,500 m2), or a hypermarket (greater
than 2,500 m2).9 In table 2 below, we show that the 5 retailers in our sample consist of 3
hypermarkets, and 2 that are predominantly supermarkets. However, because we capture
purchases on a household-level, there is considerable heterogeneity even within the same
"banner" or retailer-name recorded in the Kantar data. Within these di¤erent store for-
mats, the data in table 2 show that unique items are less likely to be found in hypermarkets,
so uniqueness does not appear to be due to a variety-e¤ect alone. On the other hand, unique
items may also be driven by shelf-space constraints in smaller stores as 4-packs of soda take
up less space than a 6-pack, and are more likely to be purchased by a shopper carrying a
9These denitions are well-supported in the literature on retailing in France (Bonnet and Bouamra-
Mechemache 2016; Turolla 2016).
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small amount of groceries in an inner-city environment. Nonetheless, despite this summary
evidence, we control for the possibility that uniqueness is driven by store format by including
store size in our econometric models of demand, and pricing, described below.10
[table 2 here]
In table 3, we provide a summary of the variables that enter the soft-drink demand model,
while the data used in the pricing model are summarized in table 4. Note that the number of
observations for the supply model di¤ers from the number in the demand model, because we
aggregate over households to model market outcomes in the supply model. In terms of the
demand data, there are 38,542 observations for the demand model. This table shows that
there is substantial cross-item variability in price, attributes, and market share, while there
is also considerable variation across brands, and retailers. Given the panel nature of our
data set, there appears to be su¢ cient variation in the data to identify demand parameters
at the item level.11
[table 3 here]
In terms of the supply data, we use input price indices from the French National Institute
for Statistics and Economic Studies for the soft drink case, and input prices of Arabica and
Robusta co¤ee, from the Thompson Reuters database, for the German co¤ee case. Both
sets of input prices are used to estimate their respective marginal cost functions, and to
instrument for endogenous prices in the demand model. In the soft-drink application, we
use a set of primary inputs in the soft-drink manufacturing process, which includes water,
sugar or sugar substitutes, an index of packaging prices created by averaging the price indices
for aluminum, plastic, and glass, an index of wages in the beverage industry to account for
the labor content of items in each category, and an index of energy prices from gasoline, and
electricity. In the pricing model, we aggregated the data by brand and retailer each week (or
month in the German case) across all household purchases. These averages were weighted
by the volume of purchase to arrive at an average price across all participating households.
10Similar store-size data were not available for the German co¤ee application.
11The German co¤ee data exhibits similar variability. Summary tables are available upon request.
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From the data presented in table 2, the resulting average prices contain su¢ cient variation to
identify any variation in retail pricing over time, and over brands o¤ered by di¤erent retailers.
Based on the data shown in table 4, we are condent that there is su¢ cient variation in input
prices over the 52 week sample period to identify variation in marginal cost.
[table 4 here]
4 Empirical Model of Strategic Obfuscation
4.1 Overview
In this section, we describe our empirical strategy designed to test for the presense, and
e¤ect of, strategic obfuscation. Because retailers may di¤er in terms of the packages they
o¤er for a number of reasons, the purpose of our demand model is to control for motivations
other than raising consumer search costs. Our empirical model has a number of unique
features that are necessary to identifying the e¤ect of strategic obfuscation on equilibrium
retail prices. Specicaly, in order to formally test whether the pricing pattern shown in table
1 is likely due to strategic obfuscation, we estimate a structural model of item-level demand,
and strategic pricing among retailers. Estimating a structural model is necessary because
di¤erences in observed prices may be due to retail pricing strategies not related to strategic
obfuscation, the additional cost of selling specic items through individual retailers, or other
idiosyncratic pricing factors. Further, while di¤erences in unit-prices provide evidence that
retailers consciously set di¤erent prices for items that are unique to their store, the strategic
obfuscation argument concerns di¤erences in margins more specically, and not simply prices.
That is, di¤erences in price are only relevant if they are able to generate higher margins for
the same brand, sold through the same retailer, in a slightly di¤erentiated form from other
retailers. Our empirical model accomplishes this task by controlling for attribute-based
demand factors through a random coe¢ cient model of demand, and a model of strategic
pricing that controls for di¤erences in marginal cost, rival pricing, and departures from the
maintained Bertrand-Nash pricing assumption.
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4.2 Model of Item-Level Demand
Our demand model controls for item-level attributes that di¤erentiate each choice from all
other choices: unit prices, the size of each individual container, the number of containers
in each multiple-container pack, and whether each container is a can or bottle. We also
control for the retailer each item is sold through, whether the item is unique to a specic
retailer, or common among all retailers, a set of household attributes that account for the
e¤ect of observed heterogeneity on choice variation, and unobserved heterogeneity through a
comprehensive set of household-varying random parameters. The primitives of our model are
consumer utility, brand preferences, and a set of heterogeneous product attribute preferences.
We assume consumers search among variants within a single brand, and search among stores
for variants that satisfy their package and container preferences at least cost. Consumers
are indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; I and items by j = 1; 2; :::; J:12 Utility depends on household-
specic brand preferences, ij, item attributes that are observed by the econometrician (xj),
household-level attributes that account for observed heterogeneity among households (zi),
a shelf price that varies by item (pj);and a random term capturing random variation in
preferences among households ("ij). Therefore, the utility derived by household i is written
as:
uij = ij + xji + ipj + zi + "ij = Z1ij1 + Z2ji2 + "ij; (1)
where the brand-preference intercept (ij), marginal utility of income (price response) (i),
and item-attribute preferences (i) are assumed to vary randomly over individual households.
We collect all of the variables with non-random e¤ects (1) in the vector Z1; and the variables
with mean e¤ects (i2) in the vector Z2 to make the notation more compact. The vector
of item attributes consists of a measure of the size of each container (SIZ), the number of
containers in the package (NUM), whether each container is a can or bottle (PCK), whether
the item is unique to a retailer (UNQ), and a set of indicator variables for each of the four
12To clarify terminology, we refer to an "item" as a specic product-retailer combination. For example, a
330 ml can of brand 1 at retailer 1 is a separate item from a 330 ml can of brand 1 o¤ered at retailer 2.
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retailers (r ) in the data (RTr; r = 1; 2; 3; 4).13 Further, the elements of zi include the age
of the household head (AGE), the education level of the household head (ED), household
income (INC), and the number of household occupants (HHSIZ). Although this is the
most general form of the model, we estimate several alternative specications in order to
test whether this level of complexity is necessary.
Allowing the brand preference, price-response, and item-level attributes to vary randomly
accounts for any unobserved heterogeneity in item purchase behavior that is not captured
by the observed arguments of the model. Formally, the parameters are modeled as random-
normal variates such that: ij = 0 + 
1
ij; i = 0 + 
2
i ; and i = 0 + 
3
i ; where the
vk; k = 1; 2; :::; K are distributed joint normal such that (v1; 2; 3)~MVN(0;) where  is,
in its most general form, a symmetric KC KC covariance matrix.14
We assume the errors in (1) above are extreme-value distributed, and consumers adhere to
the random utility assumption, choosing the single item that provides the maximum utility,
so that item choices are estimated using a multinomial logit model. As is well-understood, the
random-parameter specication does not have a closed-form expression, so the probability
of choosing item j is given by:
P (j = 1j) =
Z Z Z
exp(Z1j1 + Z2ji2)
(
X
l2J
exp(Z1l1 + Z2li2)
f(v1ij)g(
2
i )h(v
3
i )dv
1
ijd
2
i dv
3
i ; (2)
which we solve using simulated maximum likelihood methods (Train 2003). Others esti-
mate models similar to ours using Bayesian methods, however, Train (2003) argues that
random parameter logit models of the type we estimate here are observationally equivalent
to Bayesian models, and are more easily estimated using simulated maximum likelihood.
We use 50 Halton draws (Bhat 2003) in order to make the estimation routine more e¢ -
cient. Although estimating a logit model of item choice implicitly assumes the errors are
iid across consumers and items, by assuming household-specic preferences are distributed
13The identities of the sample stores are not disclosed for reasons of condentiality.
14In the estimated form of the model,  was constrained to a diagonal matrix.
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joint-normal, we induce preference correlation independent of sample households choice
behavior. That is, preferences for individual attributes can be correlated over households
without violating the iid assumption that underlies the logit model.
In the demand model, prices are likely to be endogenous. That is, at the household
level, the error term for each demand equation contains some information that the retailer
observes in setting equilibrium prices: advertising, in-store displays, preferred shelf-space,
or a number of other factors that we do not observe in our data. Therefore, we estimate
the demand model using the control function method (Petrin and Train 2010). Essentially,
the control function approach consists of using the residuals from a rst-stage instrumental
variables regression as additional variables on the right-side of the demand model. Because
the residuals from the instrumental variables regression contain information on the part
of the endogenous price variable that is not explained by the instruments, they have the
e¤ect of removing the correlated part from the demand equation. Because input prices are
expected to be correlated with retail prices, and yet independent of demand, our rst-stage
control function regression uses the set of input price variables as instruments. We also
include brand and retailer xed-e¤ects in order to account for any endogenous e¤ects that
are unique to each item. Although these variables should represent e¤ective instruments,
whether they are weak in the sense of Staiger and Stock (1997) is evaluated on the basis of
the F-test that results from the rst-stage instrumental variables regression. In this case,
the F-statistic is 619:5, which is much larger than the threshold of 10:0 suggested by Staiger
and Stock (1997). Therefore, we conclude that our instruments are not weak (table A1).
[table A1 in here - intended as appendix]
4.3 Model of Strategic Pricing
Our focus is on retail pricing only, so we model the interaction among oligopolistic retailers in
the downstream market.15 Retailers maximize prot by choosing prices for each item within
15More precisely, retailers and manufacturers are assumed to play a three-stage package-development and
pricing game. We assume the retailers in our sample compete in a multi-retailer oligopoly environment, and
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the product line of our focal brand, taking into consideration both the wholesale price and
marginal cost of retailing. Because our focus is on strategic pricing at the retail level, we
assume contracts written between retailers and manufacturers are designed to maximize the
total surplus between the retail price and the manufacturing cost. The strategic-obfuscation
hypothesis implies that some of the observed margin is due to the fact that the item is unique,
even after controlling for its impact on consumer demand. That is, there is a premium
per unit,  , associated with a unique item that is not a manifestation of either higher
costs of production, retailing, or demand-e¤ects (higher or less elastic) alone. Dropping
time subscripts for clarity, and including retailer subscripts to describe the broader retail
environment, the prot equation for retailer r selling item j is written as:
r =M
X
j2Jr
[wrj(prj   crj   grj    UNQrj)  Frj ]; (3)
whereM is the size of the aggregate market for all products, wrj is the market share of item j
in retailer r; crj is the marginal cost of producing item j sold by retailer r; gri is the marginal
cost of retailing, UNQrj is the unique-item indicator variable introduced above, and Frj
reects the retailers xed cost of stocking item j. For tractability, we consider the marginal
costs of producing and selling each item to be linear in a set of soft-drink manufacturing
(vmj ) and retailing (v
r
j ) input prices so that: crj = v
m
j  and grj = v
r
j; which is consistent
with the retailing literature (Villas Boas 2007; Richards and Hamilton 2015).
Conditional on its prior stocking decision, retailer rs rst order condition for the price
of item j is given by:
@r
@prj
=Mwrj +M
X
k2I
(prk   crk   gri    UNQrj)
@wrk
@prj
= 0; 8k 2 I; r 2 R: (4)
Notice that equation (4) implies that each retailer internalizes all cross-sectional pricing
externalities across products within the soft-drink category, but does not take into account
rival retailers play a Bertrand-Nash pricing game. Container sizes, number of containers in a package, and
container type (can or bottle) all vary over items in our sample, but we assume they are determined in a
prior, unobserved, stage of the game, set by retailer-specic contracts with manufacturers. Therefore, we
assume that retailers choose prices in response to expectations regarding rival behavior in the second stage.
In the third stage, rivals interact in the consumer market and equilibrium prices and quantities are realized.
We solve the game using backward induction, solving for equilibrium prices conditional on consumer demand.
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the e¤ect of his pricing on the sales of items sold by other retailers. Stacking the rst order
conditions across retailers, dening an ownership matrix as 
, which has element 
jr = 1 if
item j is sold by retailer r (and zero otherwise), and introducing a conduct parameter, ',
that measures any departure from the maintained Bertrand-Nash assumption, provides an
estimable form of the pricing model. Making use of this notation, we write the estimated
pricing equation as:
p = c  UNQ  '(
Wp) 1w; (5)
where bold notation indicates a vector (or matrix), andWp is the matrix of share-derivatives
with element @wrj=@prk for items j and k;where the specic form of these derivatives for the
logit model are well-understood in the literature. The conduct parameter in this equation,
'; represents a means of measuring the extent of departure from the maintained Bertrand-
Nash nature of the game played among retailers.16 An estimate of ' = 1 means that retailers
price in a manner consistent with Bertrand-Nash rivalry, while estimates below 1 suggest
that conduct is more competitive, and above 1 less competitive than Bertrand-Nash. In
this specication, our primary hypothesis involves tests of the statistical signicance of the
 parameter. If  is signicantly greater than zero, then retailers earn greater margins on
items they o¤er, but their rivals do not. If  is negative, then the margins are lower.
Given that we estimate a structural model of item-level pricing, the implied margin is
presumed to be endogenous to the pricing decision.17 Therefore, we instrument for retail
margins using demand-shifting variables that consist of lagged markups implied by the de-
mand model (up to four weeks), lagged prices (single week), xed retailer e¤ects, xed brand
e¤ects, and a set of "Hausman" instruments formed from the prices of other items o¤ered
at di¤erent retailers. In a rst-stage instrumental-variables regression, these instruments
16The use of a conduct parameter has been criticized in the theoretical literature (Corts 1999), but nonethe-
less represents a concise way of nesting a wide range of observed price behaviors. Moreover, the criticism
that it mis-represents the true dynamics of oligopolistic rivalry can be applied to any static model of rm or
consumer behavior.
17A Hausman test of the exogeneity of retail margins (Hausman 1978) produces a Chi-square statistic of
5:72, which is greater than the critical Chi-square value of 3:84 with one degree of freedom. Therefore, we
are led to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
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explain fully 82:4% of the variation in margins, with an F-statistic of 530:7. Therefore, the
instruments are not "weak" by the Staiger and Stock (1997) criteria.
5 Results and Discussion
In this section, we present the results from our soft-drink demand model, followed by tests
of the pricing model shown in equation (5) above. In terms of the demand model results, we
rst conduct specication tests to determine whether our preferred model consists of xed or
random parameters. Based on the ndings of these tests, we use the preferred specication
to estimate the pricing model. We also conduct specication tests of the pricing model in
order to determine whether OLS estimation is su¢ cient. With our preferred pricing model,
we then conduct a series of counter-factual simulations in order to illustrate the practical
e¤ect of strategy obfuscation on equilibrium prices in this category. Following the complete
presentation of the results from the French soft-drink data, we then present an examination
of the robustness of our ndings from a similar sample drawn from German co¤ee sales.
5.1 Demand Model Results
Our demand estimates are shown in table 5 below. In this table, we show estimates from
both a xed-coe¢ cient model without the control function, and random-coe¢ cient logit
demand specication that corrects for the likely endogeneity of prices. We compare the
xed- and random-coe¢ cient specications using both a likelihood-ratio (LR) test, and a
simple t-test of the scale parameters in the random-coe¢ cient model. A LR test is a valid
comparison method in this case, because the xed-coe¢ cient model is nested within the
random-coe¢ cient version. Based on the estimates reported in table 5, the LR test statistic
value is 4; 059:6, which far exceeds the critical Chi-square value for a model with 7 degrees
of freedom (14:067), so we reject the xed-coe¢ cient model based on the LR criterion.
Moreover, 6 of the 7 scale parameters are signicantly di¤erent from 0, so we also reject
the xed-coe¢ cient model based on the t-test criterion as well. Unobserved heterogeneity is
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clearly a feature of our demand-side data. Endogeneity is also important as the t-statistic
for the control function parameter is greater than the critical value. Based on this t-test,
we reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and use the random-coe¢ cient, control function
model for estimating equilibrium prices.
[table 5 here]
Comparing the xed and random-coe¢ cient models also reveals substantial bias in the
former. While the marginal utility of income estimates are similar between the two models
( 5:6 for the xed-coe¢ cient versus  5:5 for the random-coe¢ cient model), the marginal
utility of package size, and the number of units in a package di¤er sharply between the
two models. Moreover, the estimates di¤er qualitatively in terms of the marginal e¤ects of
income and store-size on item-level demand. Most important to our objectives here, the
marginal value of nding a unique item is much smaller in the preferred specication, yet
still positive and statistically signicant (2:9 versus 7:5). This nding suggests that the
"unique item e¤ect" is driven by households demand for items they nd in one particular
store, but not others. Using the mean marginal-utility of income estimate, the premium for
unique items shown in this table implies a willingness-to-pay for uniqueness of over 0:52e
per litre, which is a substantial premium given the average soft-drink prices reported in table
2. Whether this premium is supported as an equilibrium outcome, however, depends upon
estimates from the equilibrium pricing model below.
The primary purpose in estimating the demand model is not in determining the structure
of demand, per se, but rather to provide input to the equilibrium prices described in the
next section. However, it is rst necessary to assess whether the demand elasticities are at
least comparable to those found in the literature in order to evalulate whether the demand
estimates appear, at least on an intuitive level to "make sense." We present the full own-
and cross-price elasticity matrix in table 6 below. Because the model is estimated at the
item-level, we expected the own-price elasticities to be relatively large, as the estimates in
the table show. Further, because the items are only subtly di¤erentiated, the cross-price
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elasticities show perhaps less willingness to substitute across minor attribute variations than
is typical in a brand-level analysis. Most revealing, however, is the comparison of own-price
elasticities for unique items (Items 11 - 14 in table 6) relative to non-unique items (all others).
The elasticity estimates in table 6 show that unique items are far more elastic in demand
than items o¤ered in common so, absent strategic pricing by retailers, we would expect to
see lower retail markups for unique items.
[table 6 here]
Our demand estimates allow us to compute the margins implied by Bertrand-Nash rivalry
from the right-most term in equation (5) above. That is, the implied margin over the total
marginal cost of purchasing and retailing the sample items. As an additional robustness
check, we can compare this estimate to those in the literature for similar products. We
nd that the average margin, calculated using the demand estimates described above, is
approximately 0:63 euros / litre, which is both reasonable and consistent with previous
research using similar data (Bonnet and Bouamra Mechemache 2016). Whether this margin
is consistent with that actually charged by retailers, however, remains to be answered by the
equilibrium pricing model estimates.
5.2 Pricing Model Results
Estimates of the equilibrium retail pricing model are shown in table 7 below. In this model,
the parameters of primary interest are the conduct parameter (), which measures the de-
parture from the maintained assumption of Bertrand-Nash rivalry among retailers, and the
parameter  that measures the e¤ect of uniqueness on equilibrium margins. Because we con-
trol for variation in demand, and other motivations for pricing unique items di¤erent from
those o¤ered in common, through our structural approach, we interpret this parameter as a
test for strategic obfuscation in our sample of soft drink items. That is, if the  parameter is
signicantly di¤erent from 0, then o¤ering items that other retailers do not provides a means
of raising consumerscosts of comparing similar items across stores, and raising margins as
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a result.
In the pricing model, however, the equilibrium margins derived from the demand-side
estimates are clearly endogenous. As described above, we address the ensuing identication
problem by instrumenting for the endogenous margins with the set of variables described
above, through a control-function procedure (Petrin and Train 2010). Whether the control
function method is appropriate in this case is tested by examining the t-statistic on the
control-function term in the pricing model. Based on the estimates in table 7, we show
that our control function is statistically signicant, so is able to account for much of the
endogeneity bias that would otherwise a¤ect the parameters of interest.
[table 7 here]
Based on the preferred, control-function estimates in table 7, we nd that the  parameter
is indeed signicantly di¤erent, and greater than, zero. More specically, the estimate of
0:107 implies that items sold in one store only are able to earn margins that are 0:107 euros
per litre larger than when an item is sold in common, or at least in multiple stores. Based on
the average imputed margin of 0:488 euros per litre, the "unique premium" is nearly 20% of
the usual margin, so is both statistically and economically signicant. After controlling for
other factors that may explain why unique items sell for higher prices than those o¤ered in
common, we interpret this estimate as a measure of the extent to which consumersinability
to compare unit prices across stores allows retailers to raise prices, and earn higher margins.
In this regard, higher search costs are a source of market power for retailers.
Retailers, however, are not able to o¤er unique variants of national brands on their own.
Indeed, our ndings have important implications for vertical relationships between retailers
and manufacturers as o¤ering unique items must be facilitated by a manufacturer that is
both willing, and able, to produce and ship a variety of items. Only large, sophisticated
manufacturers, and equally large, sophisticated retailers are likely to be able to benet
from developing a strategy of o¤ering retailer-specic items (that are not private labels).
If there is additional prot to be made from o¤ering unique items, it is likely that manu-
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facturersbargaining power is greater for these items, so there are incentives to develop a
mass-customization program on both sides. Indeed, nding that unique items are relatively
elastic in demand, and yet command a margin-premium at retail, suggests that some of the
margin premium found hee is likely absorbed by higher wholesale prices, and hence, manu-
facturing margins (Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache 2016). Modeling the vertical channel
completely, however, is beyond the scope of this research.
5.3 Simulating Equilibrium Prices
Counter-factual simulations are useful in demonstrating the economic importance of our
econometric estimates. That is, while individual parameter estimates may be statistically
signicant, if they are small they may have little practical signicance for equilibrium prices,
and consumer welfare. Our counter-factual simulations compare the tted prices for both
unique and common items (tted from the equilibrium pricing model) under the existing mix
of each, to prices that would emerge if retailers either each o¤ered only unique items, or were
restricted from o¤ering items that were di¤erent from other retailers. We also compare the
equilibrium margins that result, both for retailers that appear to be o¤ering unique items in
order to prevent comparison, and those that o¤er only items in common with other retailers.
All of the ndings from our counter-factual simulation are shown in table 8 below.
[table 8 here]
In this table, Scenario 1 describes the status quo, where Retailers 3 and 4 are the most
intensive users of a unique-item strategy, and Retailer 2 enjoys large margins as the dominant
retailer in most markets (see market shares in Table 4). Scenario 2 describes the case where
all retailers o¤er unique products, so no price comparison can be made, while Scenario 3
shows the e¤ect of moving to an all-common strategy on margins and equilibrium prices.
Our results show that margins rise, in general, by moving to an all-unique strategy, and
prices rise accordingly (Scenario 2). Indeed, margins rise by an average of 3.3% over all 5
retailers, and prices rise by 4.3%. Essentially, equilibrium prices and margins are a¤ected
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in two ways: (1) prices rise through a direct e¤ect by increasing demand, and (2) margins
widen through in indirect, or strategic, e¤ect by softening price competition engendered by
consumersrelative inability to compare prices. In Scenario 1, each retailer has some price
premia from their unique items, and for other reasons that are not observed, and margins
are enhanced by some softening of price competition. In Scenario 2, retailers benet from
both the competitive e¤ect of uniqueness, and price-premia once consumers are in the store.
But, this e¤ect is not uniform as margins actually fall in Retailer 2, which enjoyed the
highest margins prior to all retailers moving to an only-unique strategy. In this case, some of
their competitive advantage is clearly eroded, while Retailers 3 and 4, the largest providers
of unique items, see only marginal gains as the change in strategy is only incremental for
them. In Scenario 3, only Retailer 1 does not lose margin, because it used a common-item
strategy before the change by all others. Because other stores lose their advantage, this
retailer experiences a small rise in margins. Price, however, are lower overall as consumers
can search more e¢ ciently, and compare prices more accurately across all retailers.
In summary, we nd that o¤ering unique items tends to raise prices directly due to the
demand-enhancing e¤ect of uniqueness cited above, and due to their tendency to soften price
competition as consumers nd it harder to compare prices among retailers.
6 Robustness Check: German Co¤ee
We conducted a similar analysis using co¤ee purchases by German households as a means
of corroborating the evidence from France, and serving as an evaluation of the robustness of
those ndings in a sharply di¤erent retail environment. Our German data experiment was
designed as closely as possible to the French case, namely we sampled 38 items from the
universe of co¤ee brands available in Germany, and selected some from two major brands
that were o¤ered uniquely in one of the ve major food retailers. We then compared the
prices for identical items in di¤erent stores with the prices of items that were o¤ered in
common across several stores.
23
Our summary ndings show that prices for unique items are again dramatically higher
than those that are o¤ered in all stores as homogeneous items. Because these items are
relatively minor variants on well-known national brands, retailers are able to retain the
attractiveness of stocking national brands, while preserving the ability to price their own
variants as di¤erentiated products. Whether this summary evidence constitutes statistical
evidence of strategic obfuscation, as we interpret our ndings from France, however, requires
the same model of statistical control that we present above.
We rst estimate the demand for a number of variants from two major co¤ee brands
in Germany. Each brand o¤ers slight variants among the top ve retailers, so our data
experiment is similarly able to identify the premium associated with uniqueness as in the
French case presented above. First, note that we again prefer the random coe¢ cient logit
estimates to xed-coe¢ cient alternatives as the LR test statistic of 546:39 is far greater
than the critical Chi-square value of 24:995.18 Again controlling for price endogeneity, the
estimates obtained from a random coe¢ cient logit model, similar in to the one used for the
French soft drink data above, are shown in table 9 below. From these estimates, it is clear
that there is again a demand-premium associated with uniqueness. That is, items that are
o¤ered in only one retailer are associated with a 2:04e per kg. willingness-to-pay premium
relative to non-unique items.19 Because we control for brand-and-retailer xed e¤ects, as well
as other elements of di¤erentiation that may lead to a higher willingness-to-pay, we interpret
this premium as the result of consumersinability to search for lower-priced equivalents at
the retailer.
[table 9 in here]
Whether this premium results in higher equilibrium prices, however, remains for an
estimate of an oligopolistic-pricing model equivalent to the one presented above. With
18Note that the scale parameter is relatively large compared to the French estimate (10:0848 versus 0:919).
This di¤erence is due to the fact that the German demand model was estimated with a log-normal distribution
for the marginal utility of income parameter (Hole 2007). While this assumption rules out positive estimates
for the price-parameter, the log-normal distribution has notoriously fat tails.
19The willingness-to-pay premium is found by dividing the "Unique" parameter estimate by the mean
marginal utility of income estimate.
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the demand estimates from table 9, we then calculated retail margins under an assumed
Bertrand-Nash pricing game, and estimated retail cost parameters using the co¤ee-input
prices available in Germany.20 The parameter estimates obtained from estimating the Ger-
man equilibrium-pricing model are shown in table 10. As in the French example, the preferred
model (estimated using the control function method) again nds a substantial premium as-
sociated with uniqueness, even after retailers equilibrium price-responses are taken into
account. In fact, because the average retail selling price for co¤ee in Germany is 7:21e per
kg in our sample, the estimate of 0:57e per kg implies that margins for unique items are
roughly 3% greater than for non-unique items. Further, the conduct parameter () estimate
of 2:03 suggests that German co¤ee retailing is substantially less competitive than Bertrand-
Nash, at least in our data sample. In general, therefore, our ndings in the German co¤ee
example are broadly consistent with those found in French soft drinks, and suggest that
strategic obfuscation is, while perhaps implicit, is more common than may be commonly
understood.
[table 10 in here]
7 Conclusion and Implications
In this paper, we present a formal test for strategic obfuscation in frequently-purchased
consumer packaged goods. Retailers, together with manufacturers, have an incentive to o¤er
variants of commonly-purchased items that are unique to their store in order to raise the
costs of searching among stores. If an item cannot be directly compared to another sold at a
di¤erent store, then price-comparisons are more di¢ cult, and the opportunity for prot will
be greater.
We test our hypothesis using a sample of data taken from the French carbonated soft-
drink market, and corroborate our ndings with a similar sample from German co¤ee retail-
20Note that a full set of input price indices similar to those used in French model were not available
for Germany. Brand and retailer xed e¤ects, and indicators of package variants, are used to identify any
cost di¤erences associated with selling through a di¤erent outlet, producing through di¤erent manufacturing
facilities, or using a di¤erent package.
25
ing. Using demand-and-pricing information from 3 major brands of soft-drink sold in France,
focusing on 18 package and container variants 7 of which are o¤ered in common among all
stores and 11 o¤ered uniquely in others we are able to cleanly identify the treatment e¤ect
associated with strategic obfuscation, and the margin premium that results. Assuming su-
permarket retailers price carbonated soft drinks as Bertrand-Nash oligopolists, we control for
both the marginal costs of buying and retailing soft drinks, as well as equilibrium responses
to rival pricing behavior.
We nd that retail margins are 14:5% higher when an item is sold at only one store,
compared to when it is sold at all stores. In the German co¤ee data we nd that equilib-
rium prices are approximately 3% higher for unique items relative to those variants sold in
common across all stores. Controlling for item-level attributes and retailer-xed e¤ects, we
eliminate other plausible explanations as to why margins on unique items may be higher
than otherwise. Contracts with manufacturers that specify packages unique to their store
are not uncommon, and the incentives to negotiate these arrangements are clear.
For consumer-packaged-good (CPG) retailers, our ndings suggest that o¤ering unique
items may be an e¤ective method to generate higher margins than would otherwise be the
case. However, our analysis is conned to the e¤ect of strategic obfuscation on competi-
tion among retailers, and not on the nature of vertical relationships among retailers and
manufacturers. Manufacturers likely realize the value retailers derive from o¤ering unique
items, so can use their ability to exibly produce di¤erent package sizes, or combinations
of individual items, in order to enhance their bargaining power with retailers. We leave
this analysis for future research. Our ndings also imply that consumer search is perhaps
more important than was once thought. While others examine the cost of searching in a
retail food environment (Mehta, et a. 2003; Richards and Hamilton 2016), few consider the
impact of impeding search in equilibrium price-and-margin outcomes. If our ndings are
robust across categories, the broader impact of package-customization may be important for
consumer welfare as well.
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Our ndings are more general than the specic instance we use to illustrate the strategic
obfuscation e¤ect. Ellison and Ellison (2009) demonstrate a similar motive for obscuring
items online, while more anecdotal evidence from services such as healthcare insurance,
banking fees, and household mortgages are more commonplace. Any time an item or service
cannot be directly compared among vendors, the ability to search and compare prices for like
products is impaired. Without the ability to search with full information, one of the basic
requirements for a competitive market fails to exist. If market power increases, and market
performance declines, in the extent to which rms are able to obfuscate the price of their
product from others, then the policy implications are clear. Namely, if anti-trust authorities
are interested in maintaining the competitiveness of markets, then it is not necessarily the
volume of information on items in the market that is important, but rather the compara-
bility and simplicity. Consumers need to be able to compare products quickly and easily if
search behavior is to be rewarded with relevant information. Standardized price-comparison
information should be both more prominent and relevant to the specic attributes of each
item.
Our analysis is not without weaknesses. First, we identify only one manufacturer o¤ering
slight variants through di¤erent retailers. While there are most certainly others, in categories
for which we do not have data, if we were lucky enough to identify a "black swan" in retail
pricing, then the practical implications of our ndings may be minor in the context of the tens
of thousands of items found in every supermarket. Second, our ndings are conditional on a
specic model of demand, and assumptions regarding the nature of competition in the retail
industry. Although our approach is well-accepted in the empirical industrial organization
literature, it may well be the case that a di¤erent model of demand, or di¤erent assumptions
regarding the nature of retail competition, would generate di¤erent results. Finally, despite
controlling for many di¤erent reasons that may explain why unique items sell for higher
prices, there may be others that are grounded in the institutional detail of the contracts
between manufacturers and retailers in our sample that we are not aware of.
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Table 1. Summary of Retail Prices: Unique vs Common Items
Unique Common
Brand N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. t-ratio
French Soft-Drink Data
1 1,985 1.40* 0.48 22,580 1.12* 0.25 25.40
2 583 1.07* 0.28 5,326 0.99* 0.28 6.36
3 453 1.16* 0.23 7,615 1.01* 0.32 13.24
German Co¤ee Data
1 0 20,161 6.51 1.15 2.95
2 256 9.49* 0.87 13,653 8.24* 1.61 11.05
Note: Data are pooled over 5 retailers in each case; a single asterisk indicates prices are
signicantly di¤erent at 5% level. Soft drink prices are euros / l, and co¤ee prices are euros / kg.
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Table 2. Store Format by Retailer
% Unique Small Supermarket Hypermarket
Retailer 1 1.26% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Retailer 2 7.30% 9.24% 90.42% 0.34%
Retailer 3 14.79% 0.01% 72.61% 27.38%
Retailer 4 5.87% 0.00% 3.60% 96.40%
Retailer 5 1.92% 0.00% 0.02% 99.98%
Note: Value in % Unique column is % of items
sold by retailer over households and time.
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Table 4. Summary of Pricing Data
Variable Measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N.
Aluminum Price Index 93.800 4.989 86.700 102.400 3484
Plastic Price Index 106.300 0.332 105.700 106.900 3484
Glass Price Index 104.967 0.661 103.500 105.700 3484
Sugar Price Index 147.106 7.636 134.100 158.500 3484
Gasoline Price Index 113.156 2.265 110.300 118.000 3484
Electricity Price Index 115.331 4.921 107.300 121.300 3484
Sugar Substitute Price Index 104.588 0.700 103.510 106.010 3484
Wages in Beverage Mfg Index 110.650 0.415 110.000 111.100 3484
Retail Margin Euro / litre 0.681 0.125 0.000 0.863 3484
Retailer 1 Market Share 0.219 0.041 0.136 0.302 3484
Retailer 2 Market Share 0.351 0.048 0.256 0.447 3484
Retailer 3 Market Share 0.144 0.035 0.074 0.214 3484
Retailer 4 Market Share 0.169 0.038 0.094 0..244 3484
Retailer 5 Market Share 0.117 0.032 0.052 0.087 3484
Note: Data from French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.
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Table 5. Model of Item Demand
Fixed Coe¢ cient Random Coe¢ cient
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Brand 1 4.2011 0.1080 5.8395* 3.0453
Brand 2 6.0627 0.1559 7.5149* 3.9183
Brand 3 1.8137 0.0466 3.4950 1.8228
Price -5.6434* -108.2980 -5.5477* -96.6006
Package 1.7858* 56.1941 1.2990* 37.1356
Size -8.5106* -54.9968 -24.1444* -57.3870
Number -18.9526* -47.8177 -0.0032 -0.0056
Age 0.1180* 8.2802 4.8154* 5.5546
Income -1.2788* -9.8028 9.5452 0.9499
Education 0.5317* 7.4680 5.7355* 9.7984
HH Size 0.9809* 7.5612 0.8442 0.9962
Unique 7.4897* 13.5523 2.8982* 11.0830
Store Size -9.6831* -12.7112 0.3925 0.5904
Retailer 1 4.9787 0.1280 9.4406 0.0555
Retailer 2 3.6579 0.0941 6.3684 0.1718
Retailer 3 8.0393 0.0355 -4.6744* -2.9450
Retailer 4 -6.2265 -0.1602 -3.7286* -2.2934
Std (Brand 1) 0.6803* 2.6315
Std (Brand 2) 0.9934* 3.7777
Std (Brand 3) 0.6780* 2.6129
Std (Price) 0.9198* 13.8024
Std (Pkg) -0.1049* -4.1416
Std (Size) -9.1759* -45.6561
Std (Num) -0.4459 -1.1767
Control Function 1.3047* 3.2528
LLF -59,460.3 -57430.48
AIC 33.0856 32.9802
Note: A single asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
N = 38,542. Std() indicates scale parameters.
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Table 7. Model of Strategic Pricing with Obfuscation
OLS Control Function
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Constant -5.7633 -1.0154 -4.4424 -0.7802
Aluminum -0.1235 -0.3245 -0.0092 -0.0241
Plastic -0.7373 -0.3137 -1.6766 -0.7056
Glass 1.9473* 2.3563 1.6212 1.9412
Sweetener 0.4521* 23.4964 0.4481* 23.2291
Gas 0.7861* 2.8707 0.7375* 2.6894
Electric -0.8823* -2.8945 -0.8410* -2.7577
Wages 0.4138 0.9226 0.4137 0.9232
Retailer 1 -0.1417* -3.0226 -0.1421* -3.0331
Retailer 2 -0.1094* -2.9543 -0.1127* -3.0449
Retailer 3 0.0448* 2.9249 0.0397* 2.5749
Retailer 4 -0.1808* -7.1714 -0.1836* -7.2815
Store Size -0.0799* -1.9721 -0.0852* -2.1004
Conduct 0.1456* 6.1010 0.1702* 6.6361
Unique 0.1050* 12.7451 0.1068* 12.9274
Control Function 0.0009* 2.6074
LLF 30.6651 34.0766
AIC 111.5912 105.1877
Note: A single asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
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Table 8. Simulation of Equilibrium Prices and Margins
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Margins Prices Margins Prices Margins Prices
Retailer 1 0.4211 1.1662 0.4582 1.2300 0.4340 1.1191
Retailer 2 0.5120 1.2603 0.5011 1.3119 0.4301 1.1930
Retailer 3 0.4369 1.4574 0.4420 1.5081 0.4033 1.3947
Retailer 4 0.4340 1.2145 0.4502 1.2671 0.4151 1.1544
Retailer 5 0.4673 1.4433 0.4903 1.5095 0.4520 1.3962
Note: Scenario 2 is "All Unique," and Scenario 3 is "All Common."
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Table 9. Estimates of German Co¤ee Demand Model
Fixed Coe¢ cient Random Coe¢ cent
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Size -0.0018* -16.2362 -0.0011* -9.8422
Unique 3.0927* 31.4944 2.0400* 17.0626
Promotion 9.6274* 60.9982 12.5868* 68.0320
Income -0.3879* -14.7155 -0.1349* -4.7187
Education 0.7480* 41.3799 1.5484* 36.9729
Kids -2.5753* -20.3339 -2.6418* -18.6729
Age -0.2116* -11.4419 0.4252* 12.6081
Package -5.4132* -66.4712 -4.7405* -50.0817
Brand 1 -4.0145* -70.7499 -4.6517* -74.5104
Retailer 1 0.0471* 2.4071 -0.2101* -9.3469
Retailer 2 -0.7904* -35.1952 -0.8018* -35.1018
Retailer 3 0.7956* 30.7057 1.0590* 36.7392
Retailer 4 -1.0269* -40.9702 -1.2876* -47.0079
Control Function 0.6668* 8.9795 0.4721* 6.0168
Price -7.2171* -58.3397 -10.0848* 75.3507
Std(Price) 10.9077* 20.9178
AIC 205,402.8 204,858.4
LLF -102,686.41 -102,413.22
Note: A single asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
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Table 10. Strategic Pricing with German Co¤ee Data
OLS Control Function
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Co¤ee Input 0.0003* 20.7668 0.0003* 20.9104
Multipack -0.0195* -4.3321 -0.0234* -4.8276
Conduct 2.1046* 78.5408 2.0315* 50.7302
Brand 1 0.0235* 4.7321 0.0323* 5.1381
Retailer 1 0.0044 1.5171 0.0039 1.3528
Retailer 2 0.0030 0.6221 0.0057 1.1447
Retailer 3 0.0045 1.4250 0.0037 1.1892
Retailer 4 0.0029 0.9677 0.0031 1.0312
Unique 0.0138* 3.0659 0.0200* 3.9156
Package Size 0.2810* -4.1513 0.0316* -4.4075
Control Function 0.0930* 2.5235
Constant 0.3451* 40.2060 0.3549* 37.0118
F 2666.91 2479.48
R2 0.969 0.9692
Note: A single asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level,
with heteroscedastic robust standard errors.
Prices are in cents / gram for estimation purposes, so are
scaled to euros / kg for interpretation purposes.
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Table A1. First-Stage IV Estimates
Estimate t-ratio
Constant 0.9604 0.4711
Brand 1 0.0931* 6.8888
Brand 2 -0.0561* -4.1216
Retailer 1 -0.2949* -53.7732
Retailer 2 -0.3036* -57.3763
Retailer 3 -0.1191* -23.5283
Retailer 4 -0.2917* -61.8596
Aluminum 0.1527 0.9213
Plastic -1.7776 -1.1551
Glass 1.0450 1.3971
Sweetener 0.1454* 1.9818
Gas 0.6545* 4.6473
Electric -0.3305* -4.6681
Wages -0.8067 -1.0511
Insurance 1.1303 1.8939
R2 0.1852
F 619.5
Note: A single asterisk indicates
signicance at a 5% level.
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